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Using an “event-study” methodology, this paper analyzes the aftermath of civil war in a 
cross-section of countries.  It focuses on those experiences where the end of conflict 
marks the beginning of a relatively lasting peace.  The paper considers 41 countries 
involved in internal wars in the period 1960-2003.  In order to provide a comprehensive 
evaluation of the aftermath of war, the paper considers a host of social areas represented 
by basic indicators of economic performance, health and education, political 
development, demographic trends, and conflict and security issues.  For each of these 
indicators, the paper first compares the post- and pre-war situations and then examines 
their dynamic trends during the post-conflict period.  It conducts this analysis both in 
absolute and relative terms, the latter in relation to control groups of otherwise similar 
countries.  The paper concludes that, even though war has devastating effects and its 
aftermath can be immensely difficult, when the end of war marks the beginning of lasting 
peace, recovery and improvement are indeed achieved.  
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The Aftermath of Civil War 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
War has devastating consequences for a country, including death, displacement of 
people, and destruction of public infrastructure as well as physical and social capital.  
World Bank (2003), one of the most recent and comprehensive reports, concludes that the 
economic and social costs of civil wars are not only deep but also persistent, even for 
years after the end of the conflict.  However, when the end of war represents the 
beginning of lasting peace, there are good reasons to believe that recovery, albeit gradual, 
is possible.  This is what neoclassical models of economic growth and convergence 
would predict and what the evidence of recovery in Europe (after World War II), Korea, 
and Vietnam, among others, would seem to indicate.  The objective of this paper is to 
contribute some stylized facts on the evidence regarding the economic, social, and 
political aftermath of civil wars.  
The scarce literature that studies the consequences of civil wars has usually 
focused on the costs during conflict.  Few studies analyze the costs of civil war after 
peace agreements are signed, and we would like to contribute to this literature.  Working 
with a cross-section of countries with well defined pre- and post-war periods, this paper 
uses an event-study methodology to provide a general evaluation of the aftermath of 
internal wars along basic economic, social, and political dimensions.  Although this paper 
is mainly descriptive, it gives motivation and evidence on various hypotheses 
surrounding the consequences of internal wars.  It will hopefully induce more specific 
and analytical research in future work.  
Brief review of the literature.  There is little controversy on the dire effects of 
civil and international wars.  They kill people, destroy infrastructure, weaken institutions, 
and erode social trust.  Moreover, the destruction of infrastructure and institutions leaves 
the population under conditions that increase the risk of disease, crime, political 
instability, and further conflict.  Collier et al. (2003) provide a review of the literature on 
the costs of civil war.  Collier (1999) finds that during civil war countries tend to grow at 
  22.2 percentage points less than during peace.  Using World Health Organization data on 
23 major diseases in populations distinguished by gender and age groups, Ghobarah, 
Huth, and Russett (2003) find that civil war increases substantially the incidence of death 
and disability produced by contagious diseases.  Soares (2005) provides an estimation of 
the welfare cost of violence in a sample of countries applying a willingness-to-pay 
approach to account for the health consequences of war.  For instance, Soares estimates 
that the civil conflict in Colombia, by reducing life expectancy at birth by 2.2 years, 
produces a loss of 9.7% of GDP.  Other studies focus on the neighbouring effects of civil 
war.  Murdoch and Sandler (2002 and 2004) show that civil wars reduce growth over an 
entire region of neighbouring countries.  Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2007) explore the 
influence of refugees from civil wars on the incidence of malaria in the refugee-receiving 
countries. They show that for each 1000 refugees there occur between 2000 and 2700 
cases of malaria in the refugee-receiving country.   
  The empirical literature on the aftermath of civil and international war is scarcer.  
It seems to indicate that countries do recover in the post-conflict period to at least their 
pre-war situations.  In a cross-country empirical analysis, Przeworski et al. (2000) finds 
that post-war economic recovery is rapid. Their results indicate that the average rate of 
growth during the five years following a war is 5.98 percent.  They also find that wars 
cause more damage under dictatorships than under democracies, but, in contrast, 
recoveries are faster under dictatorships than under democracies.  Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) explain post-war recoveries --considering the examples of Japan and 
Germany following World War II-- arguing that whenever a war destroys a given 
production factor relatively more than other factors, the rate of return of the latter 
increases, thus creating the forces of convergence that spur rapid growth.  Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) provide a systematic empirical analysis of aid and policy reform in the 
post-conflict growth process.  It is based on a comprehensive data set of large civil wars, 
covering 17 societies during their first decade of post-conflict economic recovery. They 
find that during the first 3 post-conflict years absorptive capacity is no greater than 
normal, but that in the rest of the first decade it is approximately double its normal level. 
They also find that growth is more sensitive to policy in post-conflict societies. 
  3Organski and Kugler (1977, 1980) analyze the economic effects of the two World 
Wars on a sample of mainly European countries. They find that in the “long run” --15 to 
20 years-- the effects of war are dissipated in both losers and winners, occurring typically 
a return to pre-war growth trends.  Miguel and Roland (2005) analyze the impact that 
U.S. bombing on Vietnam had on the country’s subsequent economic development. They 
compare the heavily bombed districts with the rest and find that U.S bombing did not 
have a lasting negative impact on poverty rates, consumption levels, infrastructure, 
literacy, and population density, as measured around 2002.  Inferring to other cases, they 
conclude that local recovery from the damage of war can be achieved if “certain 
conditions” are met.   
As mentioned above, we use an event-study methodology.  Regarding its 
application to the study of conflict, there are some important papers that precede our 
work.  Chen and Siems (2004) use it to examine the effects of terrorism on global capital 
markets.  They examine the U.S capital market’s response to 14 terrorist attacks from 
1915, and the response of global capital markets to both the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 
1990 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.  They find that terrorist 
attacks and military invasions have great potential to affect capital markets around the 
world in a short period of time.  They also find that U.S capital markets recover sooner 
than other global capital markets.  Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) use an event-study 
methodology to analyze the impact of terrorism on firms in the Basque Country.  They 
find that firms having a significant presence in the Basque Country improved their 
performance more than other firms when truce became credible and, correspondingly, a 
worse relative performance at the end of the ceasefire.  Davis and Weinstein (2002) 
consider the Allied bombing of Japanese cities in WWII as a shock to the relative size of 
the cities. They find that, in the wake of the destruction there was an extremely powerful 
recovery. Most cities returned to their relative sizes within about 15 years. 
  The paper’s methodology.  In this paper, we use an “event-study” methodology to 
analyze the aftermath of war in a cross-section of countries.  We focus on those 
experiences where the end of conflict marks the beginning of a relatively lasting peace.  
The event-study methodology consists of transforming calendar time into “event time” in 
order to be able to aggregate and extract meaningful statistics from a collection of 
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occurrence of civil war, and the pre- and post-war periods are defined as periods free of 
war.  These considerations guide the selection and preparation of the sample.   
Since our objective is to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the aftermath of 
war, we examine a host of social areas.  These are represented by basic indicators of 
economic performance, health and education, political development, demographic trends, 
and conflict and security issues.  For each of these indicators, the paper first compares the 
post- and pre-war situations and then analyzes their dynamic trends during the post-
conflict period.  The purpose is to examine the nature of the recovery from war, 
suggesting evidence on the costs of war and the extent of a peace dividend.  The 
comparative analysis is done controlling for country fixed effects and considering the 
experience of conflict countries both on their own and in comparison with two control 
groups of otherwise similar countries.   
Basic conclusions.  As result of war, post-conflict countries find themselves 
behind otherwise similar developing countries in terms of income per capita, some 
aspects of health and educational achievement, and key areas of political development.  
Moreover, longer wars produce larger damage in economic activity and make economic 
recovery significantly slower.  However, when peace is achieved and sustained, recovery 
is indeed possible.  Virtually all aspects of economic, social, and political development 
experience gradual improvement in the aftermath of civil war.  Progress in social areas is 
accompanied by a continuous reallocation of public resources away from military 
expenditures and, above all, a steady rise in average income per capita.  An important 
caveat on this paper is that it serves only as a broad overview: Its conclusions refer to the 
typical or average country afflicted by war and reflect mostly a descriptive and statistical 
examination.  Future research should analyze in greater detail the heterogeneity of post-
conflict situations, their causal mechanisms, and the policies that make them successful.   
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes the data, their 
sources, and methodology of analysis.  Section III presents and discusses the results, first, 
on the comparison between the pre- and post-war periods and, second, on the trends of 
change after the war.  Section IV offers some concluding remarks.   
 
  5II.  Data and Methodology 
 
In exploring the patterns of behavior of various economic, social, and political 
variables in post-war countries, this study focuses on internal (or civil) conflicts. The 
information on conflicts comes from the Armed Conflict Dataset of International Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). We group internal and internationalized internal armed 
conflict as internal wars.
1  In order to focus on major conflicts, we limit our analysis to 
those with the highest intensity level in the PRIO dataset, i.e., more than 1000 battle-
related deaths per year during the war. 
In an attempt to provide a comprehensive set of stylized facts on post-war 
transitions, this paper examines the following dimensions: economic performance, 
including the level and  growth rate of GDP per capita, the share of domestic investment 
in GDP, the share of government expenditure in GDP, the share of military expenditure 
in government expenditure, and the inflation rate; health and education, represented by 
the rates of infant mortality, adult female mortality, adult male mortality, primary school 
enrollment, and secondary school enrollment; political development, including indices of 
democracy and autocracy, civil liberties and political rights, and law and order; 
demographic development, such as the old dependency ratio, young dependency ratio, 
and female-male ratio; and other forms of conflict, specifically the incidence of terrorist 
attacks.  Detailed description of these variables, including definitions and sources, is 
provided in Appendix 2. 
Given its wide-ranging coverage of themes and variables, the paper uses an 
“event-study” methodology that can produce clear and succinct results. This 
methodology consists of reorganizing the data by converting calendar time into event 
time.
2  In this particular application, the occurrence of a war is the event that serves to 
anchor the data. For instance, we define the last year before the start of a war as event 
year -1, the next-to-the-last year as event year -2, and so on.  Similarly, the first year after 
the end of a war is defined as event year 1, the second year as event year 2, etc.   
                                                 
1 According to PRIO’s definitions, internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and 
internal opposition groups without intervention from other states; internationalized internal armed conflict 
occurs when such conflict involves intervention from other states. 
2 For other presentations of this methodology, see Bruno and Easterly (1998) and Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003). 
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it such that its pre and post periods can be characterized as relatively free of war.  In 
particular, in order to ensure that we analyze the aftermath following the true resolution 
of an armed conflict, we require at least 10 years of peace after the war.  This means that 
in cases of elongated conflicts with temporary ceasefire periods, our “war event” includes 
initial war, (short) interwar peace, and resumption of war.  In case a country undergoes 
two wars with more than ten years of peace in between, the two wars are treated as 
independent events.
3  
In order to reach a favorable compromise between sample size and period 
extension, we measure the pre-conflict period as the 7 years before the war, and similarly 
the post-conflict period as the 7 years after the war.  These are the “event” years under 
consideration.  One difficulty in applying the event-study methodology has to do with 
sample changes across event years.  Ideally, we should have a constant sample comprised 
of the same countries for all event years.  Unfortunately, a preliminary assessment of the 
data reveals that for each individual variable, quite a few countries have data only for a 
subset of years under consideration.  For instance, a country may have GDP per capita 
growth rate data in the first three years after the war, but no more thereafter.  In addition, 
since our sample period is from 1960 through 2003 and we look at seven years both 
before and after the war, a country could have started the conflict “too early” (e.g., 1962) 
or ended the conflict “too late” (e.g., 2000), in the sense that it would not have a well-
defined pre-war period in the former case or a well-defined post-war period in the latter 
case. On the other hand, however, if we do restrict to a perfectly constant sample, we 
might end up with too few countries included.  In order to achieve a balance between the 
two extremes, we set our criterion in the following way. For the comparison of pre- and 
post-war periods, a country will be included in the sample for a particular variable, if for 
this variable it has at least 5 years of observations in the 7-year window before the war 
and likewise after the war.  (Naturally, to be considered in the sample, the country would 
still have to meet the criterion of being war-free 10 years before and 10 years after the 
war).  For the analysis of the aftermath of conflicts, the data availability restriction is 
                                                 
3 A concern arises when some countries experience external war during the pre- or post-internal conflict 
periods.  In such cases, the periods around the war event cannot be characterized as peaceful. To eliminate 
this contamination, we exclude these countries from our samples for all variables. 
  7imposed only on event years after the war (i.e., a country does not need to have sufficient 
pre-war data).  Our samples are variable specific --it is quite likely, then, that a country 
meets the requirement for one variable but fails for another. 
Our empirical analysis studies the typical patterns of countries that experienced 
civil war, examining, first, the average difference between the post- and pre-war periods 
and, then, the average rates of change in the years after the war.  The analysis is made 
considering the experience of conflict countries both on their own and with respect to two 
control groups of countries.  The control groups are the full sample of non-conflict 
developing countries and the subset located in the geographic region of the corresponding 
conflict country (see below for details).  Since some of the variables under consideration 
may follow world trends (e.g., the wave of democratization in the case of political 
development variables or the discovery of new vaccines in the case of health indicators), 
the comparison with the full sample of developing countries is necessary to separate these 
world trends from the real costs of war and the merits of pacification.  The comparison 
with respect to regional countries is relevant because it can also capture some of these 
world trends while matching more closely the level of development of corresponding 
conflict countries.  The main disadvantage of the regional control group is that its 
geographic proximity to conflict countries may make them susceptible to the effects of 
war.   
The potential disadvantages of both control groups are reduced by the way we 
implement the comparisons with respect to them.  Considering a given indicator variable, 
for each conflict country and event year, we measure the control value as the median for 
the control group in the calendar year corresponding to the event year.  Then, we take the 
difference between the conflict-country value and the control value in a given event year 
for each variable under consideration.  Two series of differences are generated, 
corresponding, respectively, to the two control groups.  Clearly, the control values (and 
the sample of countries from which they are computed) are specific to each indicator 
variable under study.     
  Appendix 1 provides summary information on the various country samples. A 
country is marked with double asterisk if it is included in the samples for both pre- and 
post-war comparison and post-war analysis. A single asterisk indicates that this country is 
  8used only for post-war evaluation.  For example, 17 countries are considered in the 
internal war comparison of GDP per capita growth rate before and after the war; these 
countries together with other 7 that lack pre-war information are used for evaluation of 
post-war only.  Three variables, i.e., military expenditures, law and order, and terrorist 
attacks are examined only in the event years after the war due to their lack of available 
data in the pre-war period.
4   
Altogether, we work with 41 countries involved in internal wars (15 from Africa, 
17 from Asia, 3 from Europe, and 6 from Latin America) during the period 1960-2003. 
Among these countries, six (Burma, Cambodia, Iraq, Liberia, Sri Lanka and Sudan) were 
entangled in two internal conflicts. 
 
III.  Results  
  
As mentioned above, we carry out two complementary exercises.  In the first, we 
evaluate and compare the central tendency of each variable before and after the war, both 
by itself and with respect to two control groups (Table 1).  In addition, for the level and 
growth rate of GDP per capita only, we examine to what extent the duration of the war 
affects the difference between the pre- and post-war periods (Table 2).  In the second 
exercise, we estimate the average slope (or rate of change) of each variable during the 
post-conflict period, also by itself and with respect to the two control groups (Table 3).   
Likewise, we assess whether the duration of the war has an impact on the rate of change 
of per capita GDP, both in levels and growth rates, in the post-war period (Table 4).  To 
be precise, the following regression equations represent the exercises just described.  For 
the pre-post war comparison, 
  
t i i t i t i Post y , , 2 1 , * ε µ α α + + + =       ( 1 )    
t i i t i i t i t i Post Dur Post y , , 3 , 2 1 , * * * ε µ α α α + + + + =   (2) 
 
                                                 
4 For example, WDI started to collect military expenditures data (% as central government expenditures) in 
1990; and ICRG provides ratings on law and order after 1984.  
  9where the subscripts i and t represent country and event year, respectively; y is the 
variable under consideration; Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the 
years of the post-war period, and 0 otherwise; µ is a country-specific effect (modeled as a 
country dummy);  2 α  is the main parameter of interest and represents the average 
difference in the variable y between the post- and pre-war periods;  3 α  represents the 
effect of each additional war year on the post-pre difference; Dur is the duration of the 
war in number of years; and ε is the regression residual.   
For the post-war exercise, we use the following regression equations, 
  
t i i t t i Year y , 2 1 , * ε µ β β + + + =       ( 3 )    
t i i t i t t i Year Dur Year y , 3 2 1 , * * * ε µ β β β + + + + =     (4) 
 
where,  Year indicates the event year after the war (1 through 7),  2 β  is the main 
coefficient of interest and represents the average change in the variable of interest from 
year to year in the post-war period, and  3 β  represents the effect of each additional year of 
war on the post-war average change.   
The dependent variable, y, is measured by itself and in deviation from the median 
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where  t i y ,  represents the median of the non-conflict developing-country control group 
associated with country i in year t; and, similarly,   denotes the median of the non-
conflict regional-country control group for the same country and year.  Given the large 
number of variables under consideration, Tables 1 and 3 report, respectively, only the 
estimated 
t i y ,
~
2 α  and  3 β  coefficients, and associated standard errors, for the three versions 
of each dependent variable.  
  10We provide two sets of figures as complements to the tables.  Figure 1 plots the 
median in each event year (seven years before the war and seven years after) for the 
conflict countries and the control groups.  Figure 2 plots the medians in each event year 
after the war (this is not repetitive of Figure 1 because the sample for post-conflict 
analysis is larger than that for the post-pre war comparisons). 
 
Pre-post war comparisons  
Visual examination of typical trends before and after the war can be illustrative 
and motivate more precise statistical analyses.  From Figure 1, we can recognize three 
types of behavior.  Some variables (GDP per capita level and growth, investment share, 
inflation rate, polity2, civil and political rights, female-male ratio, and incidence of 
terrorism) exhibit a different pattern, including a different level, for after and before the 
war.  Other variables (mortality rates, educational enrollment rates, and dependency 
ratios) show a change in level that seems to correspond to the continuation of a (declining 
or increasing) trend established before the war.  The final group (investment rate and 
government expenditures) presents no discernible level change from before to after the 
war.       
Statistical analysis can reveal if average or typical patterns are representative of 
the sample or if cross-country heterogeneity prevents any summary conclusion.  For this 
purpose, we conduct fixed-effects regressions that estimate and allow the comparison of 
the means per period, as indicated in the previous section.  Country fixed-effect 
estimation allows controlling for inherent country characteristics that are unrelated to the 
transition from war to peace.   
Let’s start with the economic indicators.  The average level of GDP per capita is 
significantly lower after than before the war, particularly in relation to the control groups.  
This is undoubtedly a direct reflection of the cost of war.  On the other hand, the average 
growth rate of GDP per capita in conflict countries appears to be significantly larger after 
than before the war (by about 2.4 percentage points).  The increase is even more 
pronounced when compared with the change experienced by the control groups.  These 
two results are in line with those in Przeworski et al. (2000) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995):  After the destruction of the war, recovery is achieved through faster than usual 
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investment rate.  The contribution from capital accumulation, however, seems to be 
somewhat weak and significant only when compared to the control groups.  This suggests 
than the increase in growth is also due to a recovery in capacity utilization and, possibly, 
improved factor productivity.   
Government expenditures (as ratio to GDP) increased by about 1 percentage point 
from the pre- to the post-war period and may have also contributed to higher growth.  
This change is, however, not significantly different from that experienced in the control 
groups; it can be argued that for them, not being in a dire post-conflict situation, the 
expansion in government expenditures had less potential to bring about larger growth.  
Finally, regarding the inflation rate, it is significantly larger after than before the war, 
whether compared or not with the control groups.  For the few experiences where reliable 
inflation data during the war is available, the pattern is that the inflation rate increases 
sharply during the war as government revenue sources dwindle and then decreases at the 
onset of peace.  For the next section we leave the question as to whether the inflation rate 
keeps decreasing in the aftermath of war.  
The health and education indicators share some patterns.  When conflict countries 
are considered by themselves (that is, without reference to the control groups) there is a 
marked improvement in health and education in the post-war period as compared to the 
pre-war period.  (Naturally, improvement means a decrease in mortality rates and an 
increase in school enrollment rates).  When compared with the control groups, however, 
the improvements are less clear cut.  For the case of primary school enrollment, conflict 
countries improved not only with respect to their pre-war level but also with respect to 
the gains obtained by the control group.  However, for the other indicators, the 
improvement is the same as or even lower than in at least one of the control groups.  In 
the case of infant and adult female mortality, the improvement experienced by conflict 
countries is not significantly different from that of either control group.  For adult male 
mortality and secondary school enrollment --two variables related to direct combatants--, 
the improvement in conflict countries fell significantly below that of the control groups.   
The fact that these health and education indicators improved in absolute terms signals the 
important influence of world trends (for instance reflecting educational and health 
  12international campaigns) even for conflict-ridden countries; however, the fact that the 
improvements fell below international standards reflects the unquestionable cost of war.  
Regarding the political variables, there is also evidence of absolute improvement 
in the post-war period as compared with the pre-war period.  Polity 2 –measuring 
prevalence of democracy and absence of autocracy—presents a higher average level after 
than before the war.   Gastil’s measure of civil liberties and political rights (for which a 
smaller number represents an improvement) also indicates a better situation after than 
before the war.  Nevertheless, for both variables the improvement falls short of what was 
achieved by the control groups.  Again, the cost of the war is reflected in the failure of 
conflict countries to achieve international standards. 
Comparing the pre- and post-war periods, the old dependency ratio becomes 
larger, changing in a manner similar to a demographic transition.  The increase is more 
pronounced than that of the developing-country control group but not significantly 
different than that of countries in the same region.  The young dependency ratio declines 
in absolute terms, which may also be consistent with a demographic transition.  However, 
when we compare the experience of conflict countries with that of others in the same 
region, we see that the young dependency ratio increases in relative terms.  This confirms 
a larger death toll suffered by working-age adults in the course of the war.  Lastly, the 
female-male ratio also experiences a statistically significant level change: The ratio of 
women to men is larger after than before the war; this increase is even more pronounced 
and statistically significant when compared with the experience of either control group.  
The imbalance created in conflict countries in this regard is likely generated by the fact 
that the majority of war fatalities are men.   
Finally, regarding the other conflict variable, the incidence of terrorist attacks 
suffers a level increase from the pre- to the post-war period, but this change is not 
statistically significant either in absolute or relative terms (mostly due to the large 
variation across countries in this regard).
5   
In Table 2 we examine the effect of the duration of the war on the change in GDP 
per capita, in levels and growth rates, between the pre- and post-war periods.  Regarding 
                                                 
5 For Terrorist attacks, the corresponding panel in Figure 1 shows not the median but the 75th percentile.  
The median for this variable is always 0. 
  13the level of GDP per capita, the coefficients of interest become statistically significant 
when the variable is expressed as deviation from the regional-country control group.  The 
results indicate that the loss of GDP per capita as result of a major war is significant even 
if it is brief and that this loss increases gradually with the war’s duration.  Regarding the 
growth rate of GDP per capita, the duration of the war does not seem to have an impact 
on its change between the pre- and post-war periods.        
 
The aftermath of war  
The previous exercise was directed at assessing the changes that may have 
occurred after the war in comparison to before the war.  In this section, we focus on the 
post-war period to examine the pattern of change when peace begins.  Figure 2 gives a 
preview of the trend of the social and economic indicators in the aftermath of internal 
wars.  For each indicator, it presents the medians of, respectively, the conflict countries 
and the two control groups for each of the seven years after the war.  The most apparent 
observation from the figure is the pattern of recovery in all dimensions after the war.  In 
most cases, the indicators show a dynamic pattern that is consistent with gradual social 
improvement.  In the other cases, the improvement appears to occur early in the aftermath 
of internal wars.  There are no clear or significant signs of worsening conditions after the 
onset of peace.  Although this recovery does not always mean progress vis-à-vis the 
control groups, it is nonetheless remarkable.  
  Table 3 shows the estimation of the average time trend (or slope) of each 
indicator for the sample of conflict countries.  As before, we use a fixed-effects estimator 
to allow for different intercepts per country.  To save space, the table presents only the 
slope coefficients for each variable of interest, specified in absolute terms and in 
deviation from the control groups.     
Regarding the economic indicators, GDP per capita in conflict countries has a 
significantly positive time trend that is also larger than that of any of the control groups.  
This gradual improvement is, of course, the result of higher levels of GDP growth in 
conflict countries after the war.  In turn, GDP per capita growth shows no significant 
linear time trend; its pattern appears to follow an inverted U with best results towards the 
4
th or 5
th year after the onset of peace.  The investment rate shows a positive slope, but it 
  14is statistically significant only when compared with the regional-country control group.  
The average investment rate in conflict countries starts lower than that in the regional-
country control group, but before elapsing one decade after the war, it converges with this 
control group’s investment rates.  It appears, then, that conflict countries are able to 
approach their respective region in terms of GDP per capita in part through their higher 
investment rates in the years after the war.   
Public finances also experience interesting changes in the aftermath of civil wars.   
Government expenditure (as ratio to GDP) has a declining time trend that is statistically 
significant in absolute terms but not relative to the control groups.  Military expenditure 
(as ratio to government expenditures) has a clear and significant declining trend in the 
aftermath of war, both in absolute terms and in deviation from the developing-country 
control group.  Interestingly, when military expenditure in conflict countries is 
considered with respect to that of countries in the same region, the declining trend 
disappears: the threat of civil war becoming an external one may induce countries in the 
region to increase their military expenditure during the war and decrease it afterwards.  In 
brief, after peace is achieved, conflict countries gradually reduce their government 
expenditures and sharply deemphasize the importance of military expenditure in the use 
of fiscal resources.
6    
In absolute terms, the indicators of health and education share a significant 
improving time trend (that is, negative for mortality rates and positive for school 
enrollment rates).  Regarding relative improvement, the average recovery rate for primary 
school enrollment is larger in conflict countries than in any of the control groups.  The 
opposite is the case, however, for secondary school enrollment, where conflict countries 
actually under-perform relative to both control groups.  The case of health indicators is in 
the middle: the average rate of improvement in infant and adult female and male 
mortality rates is not different from that of at least one of the control groups.   
Regarding the political variables, there are some signs of absolute improvement as 
measured by the democracy index of Polity 2 (positive slope) and Gastil’s civil liberties 
                                                 
6 In this regard, note the contrast between sustainable peace (which we analyze in this paper) and insecure 
post-conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2006) investigate the effects of post-conflict military spending on the 
risk of resumed hostilities.  They find that high military spending significantly increases the risk of renewed 
conflict.  
  15index (negative slope).  However, only in the latter case the slope is statistically 
significant.  In relative terms, especially when compared with countries in the same 
region, the progress in conflict countries is the same as in the control group.  On the other 
hand, ICRG’s index on law and order does show a marked and significant rate of 
progress in conflict countries, both in absolute terms and in comparison with both control 
groups.  It seems, then, that in the aftermath of civil war, while political rights are slow to 
advance, police and judicial systems improve at an accelerated rate.
7  
Regarding demographic variables, in the aftermath of war there is a continuation 
of the demographic transition in conflict countries:  In absolute terms, the old dependency 
ratio presents an increasing trend, while the young dependency ratio shows a declining 
one.  Relative to both control groups, there is no discernible trend in either dependency 
ratio, indicating that the pattern of demographic transition in post-conflict countries is 
shared with otherwise similar countries.  On the other hand, the female-male ratio, after 
increasing during the war, exhibits a statistically significant declining trend in the 
aftermath.  This is true both in absolute terms and relative to the regional-country control 
group; it reveals a gradual recovery of the male population from its losses during the war.   
Finally, regarding the conflict indicator, the incidence of terrorist attacks 
decreases significantly in the aftermath of internal wars, as implied by its estimated 
negative trend.
8  This is the case both in absolute terms and in relation to both control 
groups.  When more complex, nonlinear behavior is allowed (not shown in the table) 
terrorist attacks seem to follow a quadratic trend with some increase early in the 
aftermath of war and a subsequent marked decline.  The end of the civil war appears to 
eventually lead to pacification of other types of internal strife. 
                                                 
7 Notice again that since we deal with peaceful recoveries, our analysis is different from that in papers 
which investigate the risk of renewed conflict.  Binningsbo et al. (2007) investigates the long term effects 
of post-conflict justice on the duration of peace.  Collier and Hoeffler (2007) study the political, economic, 
and military aspects of post-conflict situations to address the risk of renewed conflict. The results on 
political design suggest an ambiguous effect of government elections: they reduce conflict risk in the year 
when they are held but increase it in the following year.  More generally, these authors find that democratic 
institutions do not appear to reduce the risk of renewed hostilities.   
8 The terrorism data comes from the ITERATE project (see Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock, and Flemming, 
2004).  It mostly covers incidents of terrorism that have a transnational component.  Therefore, it may 
reflect imperfectly the domestic nature of terrorist attacks that characterizes post-conflict situations. 
 
 
  16Table 4 examines whether the duration of the war has an impact on the speed of 
post-conflict recovery.  As previously, this is studied only for the case of GDP per capita.  
Regarding its level, the results indicate that GDP per capita has a positive trend in the 
aftermath of conflict whose slope is diminished with the duration of the war.  This is 
significantly so for the comparisons in absolute and relative terms.  Regarding economic 
growth, the result is qualitatively similar: the growth rate of GDP per capita has a positive 
trend which declines as the duration of the war is larger.  This is true in absolute terms 
and in relation to the developing-country control group (the pattern of signs is the same in 
the comparison to the regional-country control group but the statistical significance is 
weaker).  In brief, the cost of war is here manifested in the negative effect which its 
duration has on the level and growth of GDP per capita.       
 
IV. Conclusions  
 
War has devastating effects, and its aftermath can be immensely difficult.   
Nevertheless, when the end of war marks the beginning of lasting peace, recovery and 
improvement are feasible realities.   
This paper has not attempted to measure the cost of war in all its human and 
material dimensions.  However, it finds evidence on the negative consequences of war in 
all components of the analysis.  One of them is the comparison between the pre- and 
post-war periods.  There, the cost of war is reflected in the substantial drop in per capita 
income suffered by conflict countries during the war and in their failure to make similar 
progress as other comparable countries in key areas of political development (such as 
civil liberties and democratic rule) and some aspects of health and educational 
achievement closely related to combatants (such as adult male mortality and secondary 
school enrollment).  In other, more basic, areas of social development (such as infant 
mortality and primary school enrollment), conflict countries have been able to partake of 
the wave of international progress even despite the war.  This is arguably a testament to 
the beneficial impact of medical innovations, educational programs, and the international 
campaigns to promote them. 
  17Naturally, the problems associated with war do not start when fighting begins.  
They were present before and may have precipitated, and even generated, the civil 
conflict.  Therefore, it stands to reason that the resolution of war, when it promotes 
enduring peace, may signal the start of the solution of these problems.  The behavior of 
economic growth gives evidence to this notion: Prior to the war, economic growth is 
quite low and even negative.  After the war, economic growth becomes strongly positive, 
with an average rate 2.4 percentage points higher than before the war. 
The aftermath of war is a period of recovery.  Virtually all aspects of economic, 
social, and political development experience gradual improvement in absolute terms.  It is 
interesting to note that recovery happens rather swiftly in macroeconomic areas: output 
per capita increases, capital investment rises, and inflation decreases at rates sufficiently 
high to indicate gradual convergence to similar non-conflict countries.  This pattern of 
relative improvement (and, thus, convergence) is shared by other social and political 
indicators, but not all.  As an indication of the dire consequences of war, in aspects 
directly related to victims, combatants, and political processes (such as mortality, 
secondary enrollment, and democratic rights) the rate of recovery in post-conflict 
countries is at best comparable to that of otherwise similar countries.  However, in other 
social areas (such as primary school enrollment, the correction of demographic 
imbalances, the rule of law, and the incidence of terrorist attacks), recovery happens at 
rates higher than those in other developing countries.  Interestingly, this progress in social 
areas is accompanied by a continuous reallocation of public resources away from military 
expenditures.   
We can learn from the different behavior of social and political variables in post-
conflict situations.  Take, for instance, the contrasting behavior of democratic rights and 
the perception of law and order.  The former is slow to advance and may require the 
foundation of long-run institutions to be consolidated, while the latter can be achieved by 
a variety of strong government regimes.  Even then, pacification after civil war does not 
occur overnight: Terrorist attacks can be quite pervasive in the couple of years following 
the cessation of hostilities, but even this tends to subside overtime, giving way to a true 
resolution of the civil war. 
  18This paper is intended as a broad overview of the economic, social, and political 
conditions in the aftermath of civil war.  Its conclusions refer to the typical or average 
country afflicted by war and reflect mostly a descriptive and statistical examination.  We 
have attempted to account for some of the heterogeneity across conflict countries --both 
in the change between pre- and post-war situations and in the rate of recovery in the 
aftermath of war-- by assessing the effects of the duration of armed civil conflict.  There, 
we also find evidence of the cost of war: The drop in per capita GDP during the war is 
larger the longer the war persists; more interestingly, the rate of increase and even 
acceleration of per capita GDP in the aftermath of war declines significantly with the 
length of conflict.     
The paper’s shortcomings implicitly suggest a rich agenda for future research.  
This should include a deeper analysis of the heterogeneity in the recovery patterns of 
conflict countries, a careful examination of the causal mechanisms underlying these 
patterns, and an evaluation of policies proposed for successful post-conflict recovery, 
including demobilization of ex-combatants, external intervention and aid, domestic 
redistributive programs, and institutional reform. 
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  21Table 1: Pre- and post-war comparison 
 




Post – Pre 
(conflict countries)
Post – Pre 
(developing-countries control)









[0.043]  249/18 
b. GDP per capita 






[1.537]  235/17 
c. Investment 






[0.589]  192/14 
d. Government 






[0.512]  165/12 





[5.350]  176/13 
 




Post – Pre 
(conflict countries)
Post – Pre 
(developing-countries control)









[1.565]  280/20 
b. Adult female 






[4.663]  292/21 
c. Adult male 






[4.665]  292/21 
d. Primary school 






[1.799]  292/21 
e. Secondary school 






[1.368]  276/20 
 




Post – Pre 
(conflict countries)
Post – Pre 
(developing-countries control)









[0.474]  227/17 
b. Civil liberties and 






[0.153]  165/12 
 




Post – Pre 
(conflict countries)
Post – Pre 
(developing-countries control)




a. Old dependency 






[0.071]  333/24 
b. Young 






[0.712]  333/24 
c. Female – male 






[0.280]  333/24 
 




Post – Pre 
(conflict countries)
Post – Pre 
(developing-countries control)









[1.410]  265/19 
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a.  GDP per capita 
 
Dependent 











[0.029]  249/18 





[0.082]  249/18 





[0.006]  249/18 
 
b.  GDP per capita growth rate 
 
Dependent 











[1.159]  235/17 





[2.981]  235/17 





[0.217]  235/17 
 



























  23Table 3: The aftermath of wars 
 




Post – Pre 
(conflict countries) 
Post – Pre 
(developing-countries control) 









[0.006]  167/24 
b. GDP per capita 






[0.493]  166/24 
c. Investment 






[0.163]  129/19 
d. Government 














[0.503]  26/5 





[2.770]  156/23 
 




Post – Pre 
(conflict countries) 
Post – Pre 
(developing-countries control) 









[0.197]  195/28 
b. Adult female 






[0.592]  181/26 
c. Adult male 






[0.558]  181/26 
d. Primary school 






[0.509]  189/27 
e. Secondary      






[0.256]  187/27 
 




Post – Pre 
(conflict countries) 
Post – Pre 
(developing-countries control) 









[0.113]  181/26 
b. Civil liberties and 






[0.025]  202/29 





[0.038]  104/15 
 




Post – Pre 
(conflict countries) 
Post – Pre 
(developing-countries control) 




a. Old dependency 






[0.014]  202/29 
b. Young  
dependency 






[0.142]  202/29 
c. Female – male 






[0.039]  202/29 
 




Post – Pre 
(conflict countries) 
Post – Pre 
(developing-countries control) 









[0.396]  202/29 
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c.  GDP per capita 
 
Dependent 











[0.027]  167/24 





[0.012]  167/24 





[0.001]  167/24 
 
d.  GDP per capita growth rate 
 
Dependent 











[2.461]  166/24 





[0.936]  166/24 





[0.068]  166/24 
 























  25Appendix 1: Data sample 
 
Country War  years    Economic 














diture  Inflation 
Afghanistan  1978 - 2001           
Algeria  1993 - 2001           
Angola  1975 - 2001           
Argentina 1975            
Azerbaijan  1992 - 1994    *  *  * * * * 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1992 - 1993    * *      * 
Burma  1961 - 1978    * *      * 
Burma2  1992 - 1994    ** **       ** 
Burundi  1998 - 2002             
Cambodia  1967 - 1978             
Cambodia2 1989        *     
Chad  1965 - 1990    ** * **  **   * 
Colombia  1989 - 2002             
El Salvador  1981 - 1990    ** ** **  **  ** 
Ethiopia  1974 - 1991             
Guatemala  1969 - 1987    ** ** **  **  *  ** 
India  1988 - 2003             
Indonesia  1975 - 1978    ** ** **  **  ** 
Iran  1979 - 1982             
Iraq  1961 - 1975             
Iraq2  1988 - 1991             
Laos  1960 - 1973             
Lebanon  1976 - 1990    * * *  *    * 
Liberia  1990 - 1992    ** **       ** 
Liberia2 2003             
Morocco  1975 - 1980    ** ** **  **  **   
Mozambique  1981 - 1992    ** ** **  *  * 
Nepal  2002 - 2003             
Nicaragua  1978 - 1988    ** ** **  *  ** 
Nigeria  1967 - 1970    ** ** **  **  ** 
Pakistan  1971 - 1974    * * *  *    * 
Peru  1981 - 1993    ** ** **  **    
Philippines  1978 - 1992    ** ** **  **  ** 
Russia  1995 - 2001             
Rwanda  1991 - 2001             
Sierra Leone  1998 - 1999             
Somalia  1989 - 1992             
South Africa  1980 - 1988    ** ** **  **  *  ** 
Sri Lanka  1971 - 1971    ** ** **  **  ** 
Sri Lanka2  1989 - 2001             
Sudan  1963 - 1972    * *    *    * 
Sudan2  1983 - 2003             
Syria  1982 - 1982    ** ** **  **  ** 
Tajikistan  1992 - 1993    ** **  *  **  ** 
Uganda  1979 - 1991    ** ** **  *  * 
Yemen 1994    ** **  * * * * 
Yugoslavia  1991 - 1999              
pre-post    18 17 14  12  0  13  Number of country- 
war observations  post only    24 24 19  20  5    
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Country 






































  ** ** **  **  ** 
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pre-post  20 21 21  21  20 
 
17  Number of country- 
war observations  post only 




  27Appendix 1: Data sample (continued) 
 
Country 
  Political 
  Demographic 






















    
      
   
Algeria 
    
      
   
Angola 
    
      
   
Argentina 
    
      
   
Azerbaijan 
  *  
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  *  
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Burma 
  *  
  * *  * 
  * 
Burma2 
  ** * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Burundi 
    
      
   
Cambodia 
  *  
  ** **  ** 
  * 
Cambodia2 
  **  
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Chad 
  *  
  ** **  ** 
  * 
Colombia 
    
      
   
El Salvador 
  ** * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Ethiopia 
    
      
   
Guatemala 
  * * 
  ** **  ** 
  * 
India 
    
      
   
Indonesia 
  *  
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Iran 
    
      
   
Iraq 
    
      
   
Iraq2 
  * * 
  * *  * 
  * 
Laos 
  *  
  * *  * 
  * 
Lebanon 
  * * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Liberia 
  ** * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Liberia2 
    
      
   
Morocco 
  *  
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Mozambique 
  ** * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Nepal 
    
      
   
Nicaragua 
  ** * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Nigeria 
  *  
  ** **  ** 
  * 
Pakistan 
  *  
  * *  * 
  * 
Peru 
  ** * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Philippines 
  ** * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Russia 
    
      
   
Rwanda 
    
      
   
Sierra Leone 
    
      
   
Somalia 
  ** * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
South Africa 
  ** * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Sri Lanka 
  *  
  ** **  ** 
  * 
Sri Lanka2 
    
      
   
Sudan 
  *  
  * *  * 
  * 
Sudan2 
    
      
   
Syria 
  ** * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Tajikistan 
  *  
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Uganda 
  ** * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Yemen 
  * * 
  ** **  ** 
  ** 
Yugoslavia 
    
      
   
pre-post 12  0 
  24 24  24 
  19  Number of country- 
war observations  post only  29  15 
   29 29  29 
   29 
 
Note: Countries marked with double asterisks are in the sample for Table 1 and 3.  Countries marked with a single asterisk are in the 
sample for Table 3. 
  28Appendix 2: Variables’ definition and sources 
 
Variables Definition      Source 
Internal/external 
wars 
Conflicts resulting in more than 1000 battle-related 
deaths per year for every year in the period 
  International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 
(PRIO) 
     
GDP per capita  Real GDP per capita    Authors' calculation with data from Penn 
World Tables 5.6 and World Bank's World 
Development Indicatiors 
     
GDP per capita 
growth rate 
Real GDP per capita growth rate (%)    Authors' calculation with data from Penn 
World Tables 5.6 and World Bank's World 
Development Indicatiors 
     
Investment share  Investment share of real GDP per capita (unit %)    Penn World Tables 6.1 
     
Government 
expenditure 
General government final consumption expenditure
(% of GDP) 
  World Bank's World Development Indicatiors 
     
Inflation Inflation,  GDP deflator (annual %).    World Bank's World Development Indicatiors 
     
Military 
expenditure  
Military expenditure (% of central government 
expenditure) 
  World Bank's World Development Indicatiors 
     
Infant mortality  Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)    World Bank's World Development Indicatiors 
     
Female mortality  Mortality rate, adult, female (per 1,000 female 
adults) 
  World Bank's World Development Indicatiors 
     
Male mortality  Mortality rate, adult, male (per 1,000 male adults)    World Bank's World Development Indicatiors 
     
Primary school 
enrollment 
School enrollment, primary (% gross)    World Bank's World Development Indicatiors 
and Barro & Lee Dataset 
     
Secondary school 
enrollment 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)    World Bank's World Development Indicatiors 
and Barro & Lee Dataset 
     
Polity2  A combined polity score (computed by subtracting 
the autocracy score from the democracy score) 
An additive twenty-one-point scale (-10 to10), with 
10 representing the highest degree of democracy 
and -10 the lowest 
 Polity  IV 
     
Civil liberties and 
political rights 
Civil liberties and political rights = (political rights + 
civil liberties)/2 
In Freedom House, countries whose combined 
average ratings for political rights and civil liberties 
fell between 1.0 and 3.0 (i.e., 1.0≤avg_pr_cl<3.0) 
were designated "free", between 3.0 and 5.5(i.e., 
3.0≤avg_pr_cl<5.5) "partly free", and between 5.5 
and 7.0 (i.e., 5.5≤avg_pr_cl≤7.0) "not free". 
 Freedom  House 
     
Law and order  Measured on a 0-6 scale, with 6 representing the 
best quality of law and order and 0 the lowest 
  International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Monthly data for June is selected to represent 
the whole year. 
     
Old dependency 
ratio 
Old dependency ratio = population over age 65 
/population between age15-64 (%) 
  Authors' calculation from World Bank's World 
Development Indicatiors 
     
Young 
dependency ratio 
Young dependency ratio = population under age 14 
/population between age15-64 (%) 
  Authors' calculation from World Bank's World 
Development Indicatiors 
     
Female-male ratio  Female-male ratio =  female population / male 
population (%) 
  Authors' calculation from World Bank's World 
Development Indicatiors 
     
Terrorism  Number of terrorism incidents per 10 million people 
A terrorism incident occurs in that country if the 
country is the end location of the incident or the 
start location of hijacking. 
 ITERATE 
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